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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal transition from existing coal power plants to gas
and renewable power under a carbon budget. It solves a model of polluting,
exhaustible resources with capacity constraints and adjustment costs (to build
coal, gas, and renewable power plants). It finds that optimal investment in
renewable energy may start before coal power has been phased out and even
before investment in gas has started, because doing so allows for smoothing
investment over time and reduces adjustment costs. Gas plants may be used
to reduce short-term investment in renewable power and associated costs, but
must eventually be phased out to allow room for carbon-free power. One risk
for myopic agents comparing gas and renewable investment is thus to overes-
timate the lifetime of gas plants – e.g., when computing the levelized cost of
electricity – and be biased against renewable power. These analytical results
are quantified with numerical simulations of the European Commission’s 2050
energy roadmap.
Keywords: climate change mitigation; path dependence; optimal timing;
investment; resource extraction; dynamic efficiency; early-scrapping;
JEL classification: Q54, Q58
Many governments aim at stabilizing climate change to avoid important cli-
mate damages, which requires reaching near-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions in the long term (Collins et al., 2013; Steinacher et al., 2013). Abating
GHG emissions from power generation is key to reach this goal, as the power
sector is currently responsible for nearly 40% of carbon emissions worldwide,
and fuel switching to clean electricity is a major technical option to reduce
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emissions from other sectors (Williams et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2014).
Two important features of the electricity sector are that (i) it depends on
long-lived capital that in general is tied to a specific fuel, and (ii) today’s power
production greatly relies on polluting fossil fuels such as coal (IEA, 2014). Sev-
eral alternatives are thus available to abate GHG emissions from electricity
production. Emissions may be reduced by replacing coal plants with new gas
power plants,1 or with more-expensive but almost-carbon-free options such as
renewable power. Also, decision makers can either wait for existing plants to
reach their natural lifetime, or decide to decommission them earlier in order to
switch faster to cleaner energy sources.
This paper analyzes the optimal timing of investment made to transition
from coal power to gas and renewable power under a carbon budget. To our
knowledge, it proposes the first theoretical model capable of investigating this
question, as related issues have been treated in separate strands of the analytical
literature.
On the one hand, a strand of the literature studies the optimal usage of dif-
ferent fossil fuels through the lens of nonrenewable resources theory (Hotelling,
1931; Herfindahl, 1967), with little attention to the dynamics of capital accu-
mulation (Chakravorty et al., 2008; Smulders and van der Werf, 2008; van der
Ploeg and Withagen, 2012). For instance, Chakravorty et al. (2008) find that
a carbon price may accelerate the burning of the most polluting resource: coal
would be used first, followed only later by natural gas. In this literature, re-
newable energy (modeled as a clean backstop) should never be used early, that
is before fossil fuel production stops.
More recently, Amigues et al. (2013) study the extraction of a renewable and
a non-renewable energy source, taking into account that the extraction of the
renewable source requires to first invest in appropriate capital (renewable power
plants) and pay for adjustment costs. They prove that optimal investment in
renewable is in this case independent from existing fossil resources; the best
strategy is to start to build renewable power early and spread investment over
time.2 Amigues et al. (2013) let climate policy for further research (the authors
do mention that climate policies is an obvious application), consider only one
type of fossil fuel, and disregard capacity constraints limiting the extraction of
fossil fuels.
On the other hand, there is a nascent literature on the optimal investment
in abatement capital (Fischer et al., 2004; Williams, 2010; Vogt-Schilb et al.,
2014b). This literature disentangles optimal emission reduction pathways from
optimal investment pathways and from carbon prices. In particular, Vogt-Schilb
et al. (2014b) study optimal investment in different economic sectors, and find
1 This paper assumes gas is a low-carbon substitute for coal. The relative carbon content of
gas and coal may actually depend on the type of gas and coal and on the particular processes
used for extracting and transporting the fuels (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2012). The relative merits
of coal and gas also depend on factors disregarded here, such as impact on energy security or
impact on local pollution.
2 A whole literature started by Kemp and Long (1980) has established that if extraction of
an expensive energy source is exogenously constrained, it may be optimal to use that source
simultaneously with cheaper alternatives (e.g., Amigues et al., 1998; Holland, 2003). Amigues
et al. (2013) confirm this result for endogenous constraints. Other reasons for not extracting
resources according to a strict Herfindahl sequence include heterogeneity of both producers
and consumers – Gaudet (2014) provides an extensive review.
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that the same carbon price translates in more short-term investment in sectors
with larger abatement potential and sectors where abatement capital is more
expensive. Also, Rozenberg et al. (2014) analyze the trade-off between (i) early-
scrapping existing dirty capital to reduce emissions quickly and (ii) using dirty
capital at full capacity to increase short-term production. They find that early-
scraping part of the dirty capital built before climate policies were implemented
is optimal for achieving stringent climate targets.3 These two last studies are
close to our question, but they focus on investment in perfectly clean capital
(e.g. renewable power), letting aside any intermediate option (e.g., switching
from coal to gas).
This paper attempts to bridge the gap between these two veins of the lit-
erature.4 We model different types of nonrenewable resources (cheap coal and
more expensive gas) and an expensive renewable source, all subject to capacity
constraints and adjustment costs (to make irreversible investment in coal, gas,
and renewable power plants). We study the optimal transition from existing
coal plants to gas and to renewable power under the constraint of a carbon
budget.
The analysis brings three findings. First, we confirm and extend the result
by Amigues et al. (2013): under capacity constraints and adjustment costs,
different energy sources may be used simultaneously. In particular, investment
in gas can start before coal is phased out, and most importantly investment in
renewable can start before gas or coal are phased out. The reason is that
smoothing investment over time reduces adjustment costs. In other words,
the availability of appropriate resources (skilled workers, production lines) and
the stringency of the carbon budget set an optimal speed at which to deploy
renewable power.
We also extend the finding from Rozenberg et al. (2014): it may be optimal
to build gas power plants and to decommission them before their natural end
of life, even in the absence of a policy shock. Doing so allows for reducing
investment in expensive renewable power plants in the short term, moving some
efforts to the medium term, when gas power is under-used and replaced by
renewable power.
Finally, we extend the result from Vogt-Schilb et al. (2014b), as we find that
more investment should go to the expensive zero-carbon renewable power than
3 We focus on the analytical literature. Early decommissioning of existing coal power
plants has also been studied using numerical models (e.g., Rogelj et al., 2011; IEA, 2014).
4 The interaction of investment and natural resources extraction is also the subject of the
theory of the mine (e.g., Campbell, 1980; Gaudet, 1983; Lasserre, 1985), in which installed
capital similarly limits the extraction rate of (a single type of) minerals. After reviewing this
literature, Cairns (1998) notes that “there can be three phases in the exploitation of the mine,
namely (1) a period of positive investment after time t = 0, in which production is at full
capacity, then (2) a period in which investment is zero and production is at full capacity,
and finally (3) a period of declining production”. This paper is different as we model several
resources and a climate constraint, we find however a similar trajectory for exploitation of gas
resources.
In addition, Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) have started a
literature that studies the impact of resource finitude on growth, in green Ramsey models that
feature both capital accumulation and resource extraction — van der Ploeg and Withagen
(2014) is a recent example. This literature also focuses on a single type of capital and a
single fossil resource, while in the present paper we study the transition from coal to gas and
renewable power plants.
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to the intermediate low-carbon gas power. This is not only because renewable
power plants save fossil fuels and carbon taxes, but also because they stay
valuable for ever, while gas plants eventually become obsolete.
These results stress the importance of correctly anticipating the effective
lifetime of different types of power plants when choosing among them. Such
effective lifetime is not only a technical parameter, but also an endogenous
choice depending on future investment and production decisions. For instance,
the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), in theory a good metric for comparing
investment in different power plants, may be biased against renewable power in
practice.
Indeed, different types of power plants are usually compared using the LCOE
(e.g. Kost et al., 2012; EIA, 2013; IPCC, 2014), that is the ratio of discounted
costs of building and using a power plant, including fuel and GHG emission
costs, over the discounted expected electricity production. We find that the
LCOE computed against future production, investment and prices should be
equal to the average future electricity price. But in practice, fossil fuel, carbon
and electricity prices and the resale value of power plants of any given tech-
nology may be difficult to anticipate. They depend on future investment and
production from all technologies, which depend in turn on future prices and
regulations.5 We thus investigate whether LCOEs computed against current
signals can provide an operational rule of thumb to guide investment decisions.6
In a numerical calibration using data from the European electricity sector,
we find that such operational LCOE should be several times higher for new
renewable power plants than for new gas power plants. Indeed, the operational
LCOE does not account for future increases in fuel and carbon prices, and
does not consider that gas plants will be under-used in the medium term once
replaced by renewable power. As a result, if an agent was to assess investment
in new capacity for the European electricity market by computing LCOEs from
current prices, she would recommend to invest too much in gas capacity, and
not enough in renewable capacity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 details the
model. Section 2 derives the first-order conditions, optimal production decisions
5 One way such investment and production pathways are provided in practice is through
numerical models of the electricity sector (e.g., Seebregts et al., 2002; Loulou, 2008) or wider
energy-environment-economy models (e.g., Weyant, 2004; Waisman et al., 2012; Kriegler et al.,
2014). These models do not always model adjustment costs explicitly, but they take into
account the limited ability to switch quickly from high- to low-carbon capital by building on
maximum investment speeds (Wilson et al., 2013). Several authors have stressed that in this
case optimal investment pathways are in part driven by such exogenous bounds, therefore
calling for explicit discussion of their calibration (Wilson et al., 2013; Iyer et al., 2014; Vogt-
Schilb et al., 2014a).
6 Such usage of the LCOE would be consistent with the view, popular in the early literature
on investment, that firms can take optimal investment decisions based on current prices and
current productivity of capital only (e.g., Arrow, 1964; Jorgenson, 1967, p. 145). It has already
been signaled that the efficiency of such myopic investment decisions critically depends on
investment prices being exogenous: under endogenous investment costs, optimal investment
decisions require to perfectly anticipate all future prices (Gould, 1968; Mussa, 1977). The bad
performance of imperfectly computed LCOEs is thus not surprising (and is not a theoretical
challenge under the rational expectation hypothesis). The novelty here is in determining the
direction and magnitude of the error induced by myopic decision rules in the particular case
of the transition to clean electricity.
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at each point in time, and the electricity price. It then studies the different
phases through which the power sector may go during its transition to renewable
power. Section 3 tackles optimal investment decisions and the levelized cost of
electricity. Section 4 provides numerical simulations calibrated with data from
the European electricity sector. Section 5 concludes.
1. Model
A social planner controls the supply of electricity, using and investing in
three different technologies: an existing high-carbon technology (h, coal power),
a fossil-fueled low-carbon technology (ℓ, gas), and an inexhaustible zero-carbon
technology (z, renewable power).
At each time t, the social planner chooses the physical investment xi,t in
technology i. The investment adds to the installed capacity ki,t, which depreci-
ates at the constant rate δ (dotted variables denote temporal derivatives):7
∀i, k˙i,t = xi,t − δki,t (1)
Physical investment is made at a positive, increasing and convex cost ci(xi,t):
ci > 0, c′i > 0, c′′i > 0 (2)
This captures the increasing opportunity cost to use scarce resources (skilled
workers and appropriate capital) in order to build and deploy capacities faster.
We assume that low-carbon capacity is cheaper than zero-carbon capacity in
the sense that:
∀x c′ℓ(x) < c′z(x) (3)
Without loss of generality, we assume low-carbon and zero-carbon capacities to
be nil at the beginning (kℓ,t0 = kz,t0 = 0).8
The social planner then chooses how much output to produce from each
technology. We assume production exhibits constant returns to scale: two gas
plants can produce twice as much electricity as one gas plant.9 The positive
production qi,t with technology i cannot exceed the installed capacity ki,t:
∀i, 0 ≤ qi,t
qi,t ≤ ki,t (4)
7 Through this paper, capacity is to be understood as equivalent capacity, e.g., in kWh/yr,
unless otherwise specified. For instance if 2 kW of windmills are required to provide as much
output per year as 1 kW of coal, then 2 kW of windmills are accounted as 1 kWeq .
8 The reason why this assumption does not result in a loss of generality is that our model
studies the transition from the existing situation to cleaner and to clean power.
9 We thus neglect the imperfect substitution between gas and renewable plants that comes
from their respective cost structures (in terms of fixed versus variable costs), for instance
making gas more suitable for peak power than coal. We are thus implicitly assuming that
such considerations have more impact on the optimal electricity mix at the equilibrium than
on the transition from the existing state to that equilibrium, which is the focus of the paper
(see also Vogt-Schilb et al., 2014b).
5
For simplicity, we assume the existing carbon-intensive capital is overabundant,
such that (4) is not binding for coal; this assumption is relaxed and confirmed
in the numerical application.10
Let Fi be the carbon intensity (or emission factor) of technology i. The high-
carbon technology is more carbon-intensive than the low-carbon technology:
Fh > Fℓ > Fz = 0 (5)
The social planner is subject to an exogenous carbon budget (or emission ceil-
ing), cumulative emissions cannot exceed a given ceiling M¯ :
∀t, mt ≤ M¯ (6)
Where cumulative emissions mt grow with emissions Fi qi,t:
m˙t = ∑
i
Fi qi,t (7)
Cumulative emissions have been found to be a good proxy for global warming
(Allen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009). Some policy instruments, such as an
emission trading scheme with unlimited banking and borrowing, set a similar
constraint on firms (Slechten, 2013).
Using fossil fuel (gas or coal) requires to extract exhaustible resource from
an initial stock, such that the current stock Si,t classically satisfies:
Si,t0 given
S˙i,t = −qi,t (8)
Si,t ≥ 0
While it is convenient to use the above general notations (indexed by i), we will
follow van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012) and focus on the case where the zero
carbon technology is renewable and coal is overabundant (Sz,t0 = Sh,t0 = ∞).
This is equivalent to recognize the carbon budget is more stringent than the
scarcity of coal resources — as it will be discussed later, this assumption is
likely to hold for gas resources as well, especially with the recent developments
of non-conventional extraction methods.
Consumers derive utility u (∑i qi,t) from electricity consumption, where u
satisfies the Inada conditions and is smooth enough. The program of the so-
cial planner consists in determining the trajectories of investment xi,t and pro-
duction qi,t that maximize discounted utility net from investment costs while
complying with the carbon budget M¯ and the various constraints:
max
xi,t,qi,t
∫ ∞
0
e−rt [u(∑
i
qi,t) −∑
i
ci(xi,t)]dt (9)
s.t. k˙i,t = xi,t − δki,t (νi,t)
qi,t ≤ ki,t (γi,t)
qi,t ≥ 0 (λi,t)
10 Rozenberg et al. (2014) offer a proof that carbon-intensive capital becomes overabundant
at the moment when a carbon price is implemented.
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m˙t = ∑
i
Fi qi,t (µt)
mt ≤ M¯ (ηt)
S˙i,t = −qi,t (αi,t)
Si,t ≥ 0 (βi,t)
Where r is the constant discount rate and the Greek letters in parentheses are
the costate variables and Lagrange multipliers (all chosen such that they are
positive): among them, νi,t is the shadow cost of new power plants; γi,t, the
social cost of the capacity constraint, can also be interpreted as the shadow
rental cost of capital or the marginal productivity of capital; µt is the shadow
carbon price; and αi,t the shadow price of resource i (all notations are gathered
in Table A.5).
2. Sequencing production from and investment in competing tech-
nologies
2.1. Optimal production decisions
We start the resolution with the first order conditions, which translate the
equilibrium between production decisions and electricity prices at each point in
time. Indeed, during a time interval (τ+i , τ -i ) when production and investment
with technology i are strictly positive, the first-order conditions simplify to the
following (see Appendix A for the complete set of equations):
∀t ∈ (τ+i , τ -i ), (δ + r) c′i(xi,t) − d
dt
c′i(xi,t) = u′t − αi,t − µt Fi (10)
On the right hand side of (10), u′t is the competitive electricity price (u
′
t
stands for u′ (∑i qi,t)), αi,t is the fuel cost, Fi the carbon intensity of fuel i, and
µt is the carbon price.
The left hand side is what Vogt-Schilb et al. (2014b) call the marginal im-
plicit rental cost of capital (MIRCC), extending the concept of implicit rental
cost of capital proposed by Jorgenson (1967) to the case of endogenous capacity
prices. It is the rental price that ensures agents are indifferent between buying
and renting capacity. More specifically, the relation means there is no prof-
itable tradeoff between the two following strategies: (i) buy capital at t at a
cost c′i(xi,t), rent it out during one period dt at the rental price, then sell the
depreciated (δ) capacities at t+dt at a price c′i(xi,t)+ ddtc′i(xi,t)dt or (ii) simply
lend money at the interest rate r.
Equation (10) can thus be seen as an application of the equimarginal princi-
ple: it provides a simple rule to arbitrate production decisions at each moment.
It shows that at each time step, production decisions may be taken relying only
on current prices — the rental price of capacities and the price of electricity.
2.2. Electricity price and types of phases
Equation (10) can also be used to determine the price of electricity, depend-
ing on which one is the (short-term) marginal power plant:
Lemma 1. The output price u′t is given by the variable costs of the marginal
technology, which includes a strictly positive rental cost only if capacities are
fully used. Three types of situations are possible:
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1. When coal capacities are used at less than full capacity, electricity price is
given by variable costs from coal generation:
0 < qh,t < kh,t Ô⇒ u′t = αh,t + Fh µt (11)
2. When gas capacities are used at less than full capacity, electricity price is
given by variable costs from gas generation:
0 < qℓ,t < kℓ,t Ô⇒ u′t = αℓ,t + Fℓ µt (12)
3. If all capacities are either used at full or not used at all, rental costs adjusts
such that electricity price is set by the implicit rental cost of renewable
capacity:
∀i, qi,t ∈ {ki,t,0} Ô⇒ u′t = αi,t + Fi µt + (δ + r) c′i(xi,t) − d
dt
c′i(xi,t) (13)
= (δ + r) c′z(xz,t) − d
dt
c′z(xz,t) (14)
In particular, it is not possible that at a given date gas and coal are both used
at less than full capacity,11 and renewable power is never used at less than full
capacity.
Proof. The results are straightforward once it is noted that γi,t, the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the capacity constraint, is zero when capacity i is
underused, and that γi,t equals the implicit rental cost of capital (Appendix A).
Lemma 1 thus defines implicitly three types of phases through which electric-
ity production may go during the transition from coal-fired to renewable power
— and implies that the price may jump when the system changes phases and
capacity constraint start or stop being binding (Wang and Zhao, 2013, offer a
discussion of price jumps).
As discussed in the next subsection, the ordering of these three types of
phases may vary. Fig. 1 illustrates one particular situation where investment in
both renewable and gas power start at the beginning of the period — a sufficient
condition is that c′i(0) = 0. In a first phase, coal is progressively replaced by
renewable and gas, coal capacity is underused and electricity price is given by the
variable cost of coal. When coal is phased out follow two phases during which
renewable power progressively replaces gas. First gas is used at full capacity,
and electricity price depends on the marginal implicit rental cost of renewable
capacities. At one point meeting the emission constraint requires gas production
to decrease faster than its capacity depreciates: gas plants are underused and
the price is set by variable costs from gas. During the final phase, all production
comes from renewable power.
11 We disregard the case where fuel costs compensate exactly differences in carbon intensities
αℓ − αh = µ (Fh − Fℓ) as it requires a very restrictive set of assumptions.
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(a) Production and capacity (b) Output price
Figure 1:
Output price during the three types of phases.
(1): u′t = (δ + r) c′z(xz,t) − ddtc′z(xz,t)
2.3. Ordering investment in low- and zero-carbon capacity
In this subsection we study the various phases through which the system
may go during the transition from coal to renewable. Three particular dates
play a pivotal role.
To comply with the carbon budget constraint, all production must eventually
switch to renewable power, at a first date that we denote T (Fig. 2). At one
point, polluting coal production is thus completely phased out, at a second date
T -h ≤ T . Similarly, while gas plants may be used during the transition, at one
point gas production has to decline, possibly faster than the speed at which its
capacity depreciates. This may result in an underutilization of gas capacity, at
a third date Tγ .
In Appendix B, we systematically list the various possible transition shapes,
and identify three possible sequences of investment in gas and renewable power:
Proposition 1. Depending on the parameters, investment phases may be or-
dered in three ways:
1. Two successive transitions. Gas first completely replaces coal, then re-
newable power replaces gas. In this case, investment in renewable power
starts after coal is phased out, but before production from gas is phased
out (Fig. 2a).
2. Gas and wind simultaneously replace coal. In this case, investment in
renewable starts before production from any fossil resources is phased-out
(Fig. 2b).
3. Starting with investment in renewable power. In this case, investment in
renewable power starts before investment in gas power (Fig. 2c).
Proof. See Appendix B.
3. Assessing investment in competing technologies
In this section, we study optimal investment decisions. We first derive a
general investment decision rule, showing that all future prices and the future
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(a) Two successive transitions
(b) Gas and wind simultaneously replace coal
(c) Starting with investment in renewable power
Figure 2: Numerical simulations of three possible transition profiles. Figures
on the left display production and capacity, figures on the right display opti-
mal investment. The parameters used to produce these figures are gathered in
Table B.6.
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resale value of capital are required to determine the optimal investment strategy.
We then discuss the levelized cost of electricity and investigate consequences of
failing to anticipate all future prices.
3.1. General investment decision equation
During a time interval (τ+i , τ -i ) when production and investment are strictly
positive, the optimal marginal investment cost c′i(xi,t) is the solution of the
differential equation (10). In general, such solution reads:12
∀t ∈ (τ+i , τ -i ), (15)
c′i(xi,t) = ∫ τ
-
i
t
e−(r+δ)(θ−t)(u′θ − µθ Fi − αi,θ)dθ + e−(r+δ)(τ -i−t)c′i(xi,τ -i )
The right hand side decomposes in two terms: (i) the present value of all fu-
ture revenues from selling the output minus costs from emission and resource
usage (u′t − µt Fi − αi,t) produced by the depreciated marginal unit of capac-
ity (e−(r+δ)(t−θ)), plus (ii) the contribution of the marginal investment to the
capacity installed at τ -i , valued at its replacement cost or resale value c
′
i(xi,τ -i ).
Again, the optimal investment trajectory is given by a marginalist argument:
the capacity cost is equal to all the future discounted net revenues, including
a resale value. Equation (15) means that the optimal investment cost in one
technology can be superior or inferior to the other, depending in particular on
the dates when it is optimal to invest and use each technology (τ+i , τ -i ).
3.2. The intertemporal merits of investment in gas and renewable power
Proposition 1 means that it may be optimal to invest in both renewable and
gas power at the same time. Equation (15) implies that in this case, more
investment should go to renewable power.
Indeed, producing electricity from renewable power does not require to buy
fossil fuel or pay for the carbon price. Moreover, renewable power plants keep
a residual value forever (as during the final phase, all investment goes to main-
tain renewable power at its maximum capacity), while investment in gas power
eventually stops, leaving gas plants with a lower residual value:
Corollary 1. On the optimal pathway, when the social planner invests in both
the zero- and the low-carbon technology, it builds zero-carbon capacity at a higher
marginal investment cost than low-carbon capacity.
Proof. From (15), now denoting τ+i the date when investment in capacity i
optimally starts and τ -ℓ the date when investment in gas optimally stops:
∀t ∈ [max
i
(τ+i ) , τ
-
ℓ], c
′
z(xz,t) − c′ℓ(xℓ,t) =
∫ τ
-
ℓ
t
e−(r+δ)(θ−t) (µθ Fℓ + αℓ,θ)dθ
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+ (c′z(xz,τ -ℓ) − c′ℓ(0)) e(r+δ)(t−τ -ℓ)
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∆c′
(16)
∆p is the discounted value of emissions and fossil fuels that the marginal re-
newable capacity built at time t allows saving before τ -ℓ when compared to the
12 Equation 15 is the textbook solution of equation 10 (e.g., Wikibooks contributors, 2014)
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marginal gas capacity built at time t.
∆c′ is the difference between the discounted values of the marginal capaci-
ties built at t which will depreciate from t to τ -ℓ . It is strictly positive, as
c′z(xz,τ -ℓ) > c′z(0) by assumption (2) and c′z(0) > c′ℓ(0) by assumption (3).
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3.3. Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)
Here we investigate whether the Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) can be
used as an operational rule of thumb to value different power plants. Let us con-
sider an incremental unit of capacity built during an interval when investment
is positive (at t ∈ (τ+i , τ -i )). Dividing its optimal investment costs (15) with its
discounted production over the same time interval yields:
∀t ∈ (τ+i , τ -i ), ∫
τ -i
t e
−(r+δ)(θ−t)u′θdθ
∫ τ -it e−(δ+r)(θ−t)dθ =
∫ τ -it e−(r+δ)(θ−t)(µθ Fi + αi,θ)dθ
∫ τ -it e−(δ+r)(θ−t)dθ (17)
+ c′i(xi,t) − e−(r+δ)(τ
-
i−t)c′i(xi,τ -i )
∫ τ -it e−(δ+r)(θ−t)dθ
Equation (17) defines the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) produced with
technology i. The first term in the right hand side is the discounted variable cost
(from carbon and resource prices) over the discounted production; the second
term corresponds to the investment costs of the marginal unit of capacity at
t minus its residual value at τ -i , over the discounted future production (the
levelized cost of the capacity net of its residual value). The left-hand side is the
average output price weighted by discounted production during (t, τ -i ).
Equation (17) states that at the optimum, the LCOE is equal to the weighted
average future price of the output. The relevant weight is the discounted pro-
duction from the deprecating capacity. In other terms, electricity priced at
the optimal LCOE covers for the complete cost of building and operating a
power plant.13 In practice, using this relationship to assess investment requires
to know in advance the future prices of additional capacity, resources, emis-
sions and output. This may be challenging for actual agents willing to schedule
or monitor investment in different types of power plants. For instance, it is
recognized that governments have in general little capacity to commit, and in
particular to commit to specific future carbon price levels (Helm et al., 2003;
Golombek et al., 2010; Ulph and Ulph, 2013).14
The question we address here is whether LCOEs computed against current
price signals may provide an operational rule of thumb to value different types
of power plants.15 Such an operational LCOE reads:
Li,t = (r + δ) c′i(xi,t) + µt Fi + αi,t (18)
Li,t is the sum of the annualized investment cost, the carbon cost and the fuel
cost.
Proposition 2. Equalizing the operational LCOE across technologies would
lead to invest relatively too much in gas power and too little in renewable power
13 We ignore here all intermittency issues, which add a cost to renewable sources, and may
be a rationale to use some gas during the final phase (Joskow, 2011; Ambec and Crampes,
2012; Bazilian et al., 2013; Ueckerdt et al., 2013).
14 See also Spiro (2012) on the limited capacity of investors and regulators to anticipate
prices over long time horizons.
15 As discussed in footnote 6, such operational LCOE is consistent with the idea that agents
can take optimal investment decisions based on current price signals only.
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Proof. Let x˜z,t and x˜ℓ,t be two investment schedules that equalize the opera-
tional LCOE accross technologies, such that:
(r + δ)c′z (x˜z,t) + µFz + αz = (r + δ)c′ℓ (x˜ℓ,t) + µFℓ + αℓ (19)
Ô⇒ c′z (x˜z,t) − c′ℓ (x˜ℓ,t) = µFℓ + αℓ
r + δ (20)
Comparing the allocation implied by (20) with the optimal rule stated in Corol-
lary 1 shows that equalizing the operational LCOE across technologies misses
the future increase for carbon and fossil resources prices, and misses the term
correcting for future changes in the value of capacities, leading to relatively
too much investment in gas power and not enough investment in renewable
power.
In the next section we use numerical simulations calibrated on the European
power sector and find that during the optimal transition to clean power, renew-
able power plants should be built at an operational LCOE several times higher
than new gas power plants.
4. Numerical application to the European electricity sector
4.1. Functional forms, data and calibration
We calibrate the model with data from the European power sector as de-
scribed in the European 2050 Energy Roadmap (EU, 2011). In this numerical
application, efficient gas power plants (the low-carbon technology) and onshore
wind (the zero-carbon technology) are used to phase out the existing polluting
capacities represented as the average legacy thermal production mix (Table 1).
To better fit the data, we express installed capacity ki,t in peak capacity
(GW), and production qi,t in GWh/yr. Production is constrained by a maxi-
mum number of operating hours Hi. For instance, a given windmill will produce
electricity only at the moments where it is windy, which expectedly happens a
given number of hours per year.
We assume for simplicity that all technologies have the same depreciation
rate δ, calibrated as δ = 1/lifetime assuming a lifetime of 30 years (IEA, 2010).
We consider that Europe is price-taker on the fossil resources costs αi,t, which
follows the trajectory assumed in the European 2050 Roadmap (Table 2). Note
that αh corresponds to the average price of the resources of the legacy technology
mix (Table 1).
To calibrate the cost functions, we assume that when investment equals the
actual average annual investment flow in Europe between 2009 and 2011 (Xi),
the marginal investment cost Cmi is equal to the OECD median value for 2010
(as found in IEA, 2010). We write the cost function as:
ci(xi,t) = Cmi ⋅Xi ⋅ (A xi,t
Xi
+
1 −A
2
(xi,t
Xi
)2) (21)
Ô⇒ c′i (Xi) = Cmi (22)
A ∈ (0,1) is a convexity parameter, equal across technologies for simplicity.
When A = 1, the marginal investment cost are constant, there is no adjust-
ment cost for production capacity, and optimal investment pathways can ex-
hibit jumps. When A = 0, the marginal cost curves are linear, capacity accumu-
lated at very low speed is free (limxi,t→0;A=0 c
′
i(xi,t) = 0), and the cost of new
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Table 1: Technology sets considered in the numerical model
Set Abbreviation Composition
High carbon technology Legacy
Average thermal production mix in
2008: 40% gas , 50% coal , 10% oil (EN-
ERDATA, 2012)
Low carbon technology Gas Efficient gas
Zero carbon technology Wind Onshore wind
Table 2: Fuel price trajectories of the fossil technology sets in $/MWh (EU,
2011)
2008 2025 2035 2050
Legacy 42.5 46 48 39
Gas 65 76 75 60
capacity doubles when the investment pace doubles. For intermediate value
A ∈ (0,1), new capacity is always costly, and the marginal cost of new capacity
increases with the investment pace. We first assume quadratic costs (that is
linear marginal costs and A = 0), and perform later a sensitivity anaysis on A.
The demand is assumed inelastic in the short-term, and follows an exogenous
long-term growth. Its value in 2008 is calibrated as the reference fossil energy
production (from coal, oil and gas), that is D0 = 1 940 TWh/yr (ENERDATA,
2012). The central scenario of the Roadmap forecasts a 700 TWh/yr increase
of electricity consumption between 2008 and 2050, that we model as a linear
growth of G = 16.5 TWh/yr2. Demand after time t is thus:
Dt =D0 + t ⋅G (23)
Acording to Trotignon and Delbosc (2008), emission allowances allocated to the
power sector in 2008 amounted to Eref = 1.03 GtCO2/yr , leading to a reference
emission rate of 530 tCO2/GWh. A linear decrease of these emissions until
2050, as planned in the Roadmap, yields a carbon budget of M¯ = 22 GtCO2. A
sensitivity analysis on M¯ is performed later. We use r = 5 %/yr for the social
discount rate.
4.2. Results
Fig. 3 shows production, investment, the investment cost, the electricity price
and the operational LCOE obtained in the numerical application. The following
lists several interesting results.
The social planner does not invest in the legacy capacity; moreover, existing
legacy plants start being decommissioned as soon as the climate policy is imple-
mented (Fig. 3a). In the central scenario, legacy fossil-fueled plants are entirely
phased out in 2028. With our technology assumptions, the carbon budget is too
loose to justify a complete transition by 2050, but instead phases out all fossil
production by 2064.
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Table 3: Technology-specific data used in the numerical application
Description Unit Legacy Gas Wind Source
Cmi
Nominal
investment costs
$/kW
1 800 1 200 2 000
IEA (2010)
Xi
Average annual
new capacity in
Europe
GW/yr 4.2 11 10 ENERDATA (2012)
Hi
Average annual
operating hours
h/yr
7 500 7 500 2 000
IEA (2010)
Fi Carbon intensity gCO2/kWh
530 330
0
ENERDATA (2012);
Trotignon and Delbosc
(2008)
Table 4: General parameter values used in the numerical application
Description Unit Value Source
r Discount rate %/yr 5
M¯ Carbon budget (central value) GtCO2 22 UE (2011)
D0 Electricity demand in 2008 TWh/y 1 940
ENERDATA (2012);
EU (2011)
G Annual growth of demand TWh/y 16.5 EU (2011)
δ Depreciation rate %/yr 3.33 IEA (2010)
A Convexity parameter (central value) ⋅ 0
Investment in renewable starts at the beginning of the transition, at the same
time as gas and before coal or gas are phased out (Fig. 3c). It grows over time,
and only decreases for a short period from 2055 to 2064 when gas is phased out,
as most of the power plants have already been replaced (Fig. 3a). Investment
in renewable starts at 22 GW/yr in 2008, more than twice the actual average
investment rate observed between 2009 and 2011, and reaches 70 GW/yr in
2060. Investment grows again after 2064 to maintain the installed renewable
capacity and meet the growing demand.
Gas plants operate as a temporary bridge between coal and renewable. As
seen in Fig. 3c, investment in gas starts since the beginning of the transition
in 2008, lowering the need for investment in renewable. In 2035, however, in-
vestment in gas stops and gas capacities start being underused, allowing gas to
be replaced faster by renewable power. The sensitivity analysis (Fig. 4d) shows
that it is optimal to build gas power plants transiently for any positive carbon
budget ranging up to 45 GtCO2: investment always starts in 2008 and, with
quadratic investment costs, plants are underused immediately after investment
stops. Only carbon budgets lower than 17 GtCO2 make gas investment stop be-
fore 2020 (for comparison, the Roadmap implicitly sets a budget of 22 GtCO2).
Fig. 4c shows that the optimal maximal gas capacity increases with the con-
vexity of the investment functions (when A tends to 0). The more convex the
investment costs, the more renewable investment must be smoothed and the
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(a) Production and capacity (b) Operational levelized cost of elec-
tricity and electricity price
(c) Investment (d) Marginal investment cost
Figure 3: Numerical application to the European electricity sector
more gas is needed. In contrast, for constant investment costs (when A tends
to 1), the social planner would replace all the stock of capital with renewable
power plants at once.
The capacity cost is always higher for renewable than for gas — as predicted
by Corollary 1. Fig. 3d displays the marginal costs for new capacities (gas and
renewable) along the period. They essentially follow the investment trajectories.
Gas investment costs decrease from 2015 on, as the average power plants be-
comes less and less carbon-intensive, making investment in low carbon capacity
less and less profitable.
Electricity prices are displayed in Fig. 3b. In a first phase, before 2028, the
marginal capacity is the legacy dirty technology. The endogenous carbon price
is 137 $/tCO2, representing 73 $/MWh or 63 % of the electricity price during the
phase while the legacy power plant is marginal. After the dirty technology has
been phased out, gas becomes the marginal technology and is under-used from
2036 to 2064. In between and after fossil technologies have been phased out, the
electricity price equals the rental cost of renewable power plants (Lemma 1).
Finally, along the simulated optimal path, the levelized cost of electricity
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(a) LCOE and price in 2008 as a func-
tion of the convexity parameter A
(b) LCOE and price in 2008 as a func-
tion of the carbon budget M¯
(c) Maximal gas capacity as a function
of the convexity parameter A
(d) Date when gas investment stops as
a function of the carbon budget M¯
Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis on the carbon budget and the convexity parameter
computed against current prices and current returns (the operational LCOEs) is
several times higher for renewable power than for gas. Fig. 3b shows the LCOEs
and the electricity price. The LCOE is higher than the electricity price for
renewable plants, and lower for gas plants. Fig. 4a and 4b show the operational
LCOEs of renewable and gas in 2008, along with the electricity price for a range
of parameters.16 For a wide range of carbon budget and convexity parameter
values, the operational LCOE is 2 to 5 times higher for renewable power than
for gas. This difference comes from the wrong anticipations one makes when
considering only current signals. These are biased toward gas for two reasons:
the future increase in fuel and carbon price is not accounted for, and gas is
assumed to produce at full capacity for its whole lifetime.
These simulations thus suggest that if an agent was to assess investment in
new capacity for the European electricity market by computing LCOEs from
current prices, she would recommend to invest too much in gas capacity, and
not enough in renewable capacity.
16 Note that computing the LCOE only make sense if investment is strictly positive.
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5. Conclusion
Our analysis makes several simplifications. For instance, we do not account
for knowledge accumulation and directed technical change, which have been
found to play a key role in the optimal transition from fossil to renewable
energy (Tahvonen and Salo, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Andre´ and Smul-
ders, 2014; Gerlagh et al., 2014). Knowledge spillovers would tend to increase
the short-term gap between optimal investment in renewable and gas power
(Rosendahl, 2004; del Rio Gonzalez, 2008), adding to the effect of adjustment
costs studied here. We also disregarded uncertainty, known to play a key role
in optimal accumulation of capital (Pindyck, 1991), optimal emission reduction
pathways (Ha Duong et al., 1997), and optimal extraction of several energy
sources (Gaudet and Lasserre, 2011). Finally, we did not account for the pos-
sibility to retrofit existing plants (notably with carbon capture and storage),
and the possibility to use cleaner fuels (in particular derived from biomass) in
existing power plants.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis suggests that capacity con-
straints and adjustment costs play an essential role in the transition from coal to
gas and renewable energy. In particular, investment in renewable power should
start before coal and gas resources are phased out, and should be higher than
investment in gas power. The transition to carbon-free power may nonetheless
benefit from temporary investment in intermediate technologies such as gas, to
decrease the need for costlier renewable in the short term. The resulting plants
would however need to be subsequently decommissioned before the end of their
natural lifetime, to give room to more carbon-free power in the medium term.
Our results shed light on technical choices (e.g. investors can consider gas
plants with shorter scheduled lifetimes or an option to retrofit) as well as policy
decisions (when setting milestones for carbon-free power or managing the social
consequences of decommissioning stranded fossil-fueled plants). Moreover, we
warn that the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) computed against current
price signals is biased toward gas power and against renewable power. An
accurate valuation of different types of power plants requires to anticipate a
comprehensive long-term investment and production pathway, and in particular
that gas built to replace coal in the short term may itself be replaced with
renewable in the medium term.
Finally, while this paper focuses on power generation, it more broadly in-
forms on the ordering and assessment of investment in polluting fossil-fueled
and clean capital; its results could be extended to other capitalistic and energy-
intensive sectors, such as buildings or transportation.
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A. Efficiency conditions
Table A.5: Variables and parameters notations used in the model.
Description Possible units
i technology index
h high-carbon technology (h)
l low-carbon technology (ℓ)
z zero-carbon technology (z)
ki,t capacity of technology i at time t GW
qi,t production of technology i at time t GW
xi,t physical investment in technology i at time t GW/yr
νi,t shadow price of new capacity i $/GW
µt cost of emissions $/tCO2
αi,t cost of resource used by technology i $/MWh
γi,t shadow rental cost of existing capacity i $/(GW⋅ yr)
u′t output price $/GWh
ci(xi,t) monetary investment in technology i at time t $/yr
mt stock of atmospheric carbon tCO2
δ depreciation rate yr
−1
r discount rate yr
−1
Fi emission rate of technology i tCO2/GWh
M¯ carbon budget tCO2
u (∑i qi,t) consumer utility $/yr
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The present value Hamiltonian associated with Problem 9 reads:
H = e−rt [u(∑
i
qi,t) −∑
i
ci(xi,t) −∑
i
νi,t (δ ki,t − xi,t)
− µt∑
i
Ri qi,t − ηt (mt − M¯) −∑
i
(αi,t qi,t − βi,t Si,t)
−∑
i
γi,t (qi,t − ki,t) +∑
i
λi,t qi,t]
(A.1)
The first-order conditions are:
∂H
∂xi
= 0 ⇐⇒ c′i(xi,t) = νi,t (A.2)
∂H
∂qi
= 0 ⇐⇒ λi,t − µtRi − αi,t + u′t = γi,t (A.3)
∂H
∂ki
= −d (e−rtνi,t)
dt
⇐⇒ (δ + r) νi,t − ν˙i,t = γi,t (A.4)
∂H
∂mt
= −d (e−rtµt)
dt
⇐⇒ µ˙t − r µt = −ηt (A.5)
∂H
∂Si
= −d (e−rtαi,t)
dt
⇐⇒ α˙i − r αi,t = −βi,t (A.6)
The complementary slackness conditions are:
∀i, t, λi,t ≥ 0, qi,t ≥ 0 and λi,t qi,t = 0 (A.7)
∀i, t, ηt ≥ 0, M¯ −mt ≥ 0 and ηt (M¯ −mt) = 0 (A.8)
∀i, t, βi,t ≥ 0, Si,t ≥ 0 and βi,t Si,t = 0 (A.9)
∀i, t, γi,t ≥ 0, ki,t − qi,t ≥ 0 and γi,t (ki,t − qi,t) = 0 (A.10)
The transversality condition is replaced by the terminal condition that at
some point the atmospheric carbon reaches its ceiling (6).
B. Investment and production phases
B.1. Carbon budget constraint and steady state
Let Tη be the date when the ceiling on atmospheric carbon is reached.
The carbon-free atmosphere can be seen as a non renewable resource depleted
by GHG emissions. In this context, the optimal current carbon price follows
Hotelling’s rule, i.e. grows at the discount rate r (A.5, A.8):
∀t < Tη, µt = µert > 0 (B.1)
where µ is the carbon price at t = 0. Eq. B.1 reflects the fact that abatement
realized at any time contributes equally to meet the carbon budget. We focus
on the case where the carbon budget is binding, so that the carbon price µt is
strictly positive.
Let T be the date when the system reaches a steady state. During the steady
state, the clean backstop produces all the output. Indeed, atmospheric carbon
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is stable, hence emissions and production from high- and low-carbon fossil fuels
must be nil (4, 6, 7):
∀t ≥ T, m˙t = 0 Ô⇒ qℓ,t = qh,t = 0 (B.2)
When the carbon budget is binding, the date when the ceiling on atmospheric
carbon is reached and the steady state necessarily coincide: T = Tη.
B.2. Output production and fossil fuel deposits
Initially, all the output is produced from coal by assumption. Coal produc-
tion is eventually replaced by gas or renewable power. Let T -h be the date when
high-carbon production stops:
∀t ≥ T -h, qh,t = 0 (B.3)
This happens necessarily before the steady state:
T -h ≤ T (B.4)
Similarly, let T +i be the date when production of technology i ∈ {ℓ, z} starts, and
T -ℓ the date when gas production stops. Note that only low-carbon production
eventually stops, since zero-carbon energy is used indefinitely during the steady
state.17
Let T β be the date when the low-carbon fossil fuel deposit is depleted. If it
exists (i.e. if the gas deposit is eventually depleted), T β coincides with the end
of production from low-carbon fuel:
∃T β Ô⇒ T βℓ = T -ℓ (B.5)
Optimality then requires that fossil fuel prices follow the Hotelling rule: their
current price αℓ,t is increasing at the discounting rate before they are exhausted
(A.6, A.9):
∀t < T β , αℓ,t = αℓ ert > 0 (B.6)
B.3. Investment and under-utilization of capacities
For coal to be phased out, production in one of the alternative technologies
must have started:
T -h ≥min(T +ℓ , T +z ) (B.7)
Let τ+i ≤ T +i be the date when investment in capacity i starts, and τ -i the date
when it stops. Note that only the investment in gas stops eventually, since
renewable capacity is used indefinitely during the steady state and must be
maintained as δ > 0.
If gas is used during the transition, production from gas must decline before
the steady state, either because gas reserves are depleted, or to reduce GHG
emissions to zero. If it declines faster than the depreciation rate of capacities,
17 As the marginal utility tends to infinity when energy consumption tends to zero energy
production is always strictly positive.
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installed gas capacities may be underused. Let Tγ ∈ [T +ℓ , T -ℓ ] be the date when
gas production is lower than its capacity:
∀t ≥ Tγ , kℓ,t > 0 Ô⇒ qℓ,t < kℓ,t (B.8)
The social planner stops to invest in gas power plants when the marginal cost
of new capacities exceeds its marginal benefit:
c′ℓ(0) = ∫ Tγ
τ -
ℓ
e−(r+δ)(θ−τ
-
ℓ)(u′θ − µθ Fi − αi,θ)dθ (B.9)
such that in general she stops investing before starting to underuse gas capacities
τ -ℓ ≤ Tγ (B.10)
In particular, if c′ℓ(0) = 0 then τ -ℓ = Tγ (this is the case in Fig. 3).
We assume that coal capacity is overabundant at the beginning of the transi-
tion, meaning that its capacity is underused from the start. In other words, coal
is marginal during the first phase of the transition. As two technologies cannot
be marginal at the same time (Lemma 1), gas can be the marginal technology
(and gas capacity gets underused) only after coal is completely phased out:
T -h ≤ Tγ ≤ T -ℓ (B.11)
If gas is used, it’s thus used from the moment there are some gas capacities
∃(T +ℓ , τ+ℓ ) Ô⇒ T +ℓ = τ+ℓ (B.12)
B.11 also means that if gas is used, once gas production ends, coal production
has ended, and emissions are null. The end of gas production thus coincides
with the steady state:
∃T -ℓ Ô⇒ T -ℓ = T (B.13)
If production does not decrease with time, the moment when gas starts being
underused necessarily happens after wind started to produce:
T +z ≤ Tγ (B.14)
Finally, because variable costs from renewable are nil, its never optimal not to
use renewable at full capacity:
T +z = τ+z (B.15)
B.4. Summary of the transition phases
This leaves us with three possible transition profiles:
1. Two successive transitions. Gas first completely replaces coal, then re-
newable power replaces gas.
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Table B.6: Parameters used to produce Fig. 2
Fig. 2c Fig. 2b Fig. 2a
δ .0333 .0333 .0333
M¯ 42 38 40
D 1940 1940 1940
r .05 .05 .05
Rz 0 0 0
Rh .00063 .00063 .00063
Rℓ .0004 .0004 .0003
Hz 7500 7500 7500
Hh 7500 7500 7500
Hℓ 7500 7500 7500
Fig. 2c Fig. 2b Fig. 2a
αz 0 0 0
αh .055 .055 .055
αℓ .1 .06 .06
Cmz 75000 75000 80000
Cmh 18000 18000 18000
Cmℓ 35000 12000 12000
Xz .00003 .0005 .001
Xh .005 .005 .005
Xℓ .0001 .001 .01
A .9 .9 .9
I 12 12 2
2. Gas and wind simultaneously replace coal, starting with gas.
τ+ℓ = T +ℓ
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3. Gas and wind simultaneously replace coal, starting with renewable power.
τ+z = T +z
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Fig. 2 illustrates the three possible transition profiles, by using the parameters
gathered in Table B.6 and the following cost function:
c′i(xi,t) = Cmi ⋅A ⋅ I +Cmi ⋅ (1 −A)xi,t
Xi
(B.19)
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